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ABSTRACT
Disclosure of information reflects the presentation of the company’s annual 
report. One general purpose of disclosure is to have a basis for decision 
making. This study aims to examine the effect of financial performance 
(ROA, DER, CR), board of commissioners (BS, BI), blockholder ownership, 
auditor type, and firm age on voluntary disclosure. The population of this 
study is mining companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange period 
2012-2016. The number of data is 196. Sampling is conducted using 
purposive sampling method. The data were analyzed using  SEM-PLS 
with SmartPLS 3.0 program. The results show that firm age has no effect 
on voluntary disclosure, while blockholder ownership has a significant 
and negative effect on voluntary disclosure. Financial performance, board 
of commissioners and auditors type have a significant and positive effect 
on voluntary disclosure. The impact of this research is that voluntary 
disclosure can be used to increase the completeness of company information 
for investors and creditors.
ABSTRAK
Pengungkapan informasi mencerminkan penyajian laporan tahunan 
perusahaan. Salah satu tujuan umum pengungkapan informasi adalah 
sebagai dasar dalam pengambilan keputusan. Penelitian ini bertujuan 
untuk menguji pengaruh kinerja keuangan (ROA, DER, CR), dewan 
komisaris (BS, BI), kepemilikan blockholder, tipe auditor, dan umur 
perusahaan terhadap pengungkapan sukarela. Populasi penelitian ini 
adalah perusahaan pertambangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia 
periode 2012-2016. Jumlah data adalah 196. Pengambilan sampel dilakukan 
dengan menggunakan metode purposive sampling. Data dianalisis dengan 
menggunakan SEM-PLS dengan program SmartPLS 3.0. Hasil analisis 
data menunjukkan bahwa umur perusahaan tidak berpengaruh terhadap 
pengungkapan sukarela, sedangkan kepemilikan blockholder memiliki 
pengaruh negatif yang signifikan terhadap pengungkapan sukarela. 
Kinerja keuangan, ukuran dewan komisaris dan tipe auditor memiliki 
pengaruh positif yang signifikan terhadap pengungkapan sukarela. 
Dampak dari penelitian ini adalah bahwa pengungkapan sukarela dapat 
digunakan untuk meningkatkan kelengkapan informasi perusahaan bagi 
investor dan kreditor.
1. INTRODUCTION
The business and financial world in Indonesia 
is growing so rapidly that the information 
contained in the company’s annual report 
becomes very important in streamlining the 
allocation of investment funds. The annual 
report serves as the main media in disclosing 
information about the company’s financial 
condition that is very beneficial for decision 
makers, such as shareholders, creditors, and 
stakeholders (Krishna, 2013).
The high demand for information about 
the company’s prospects requires most 
company management to conduct voluntary 
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disclosures (Damayanti and Priyadi, 2016). 
Stakeholder dissatisfaction arises because of 
the crisis of trust and security in investment. 
Therefore, companies should be able to provide 
detailed, clear, fair, and timely information.
One of the cases related to information 
disclosure is the case involving PT. Timah Tbk. 
This company had made many mistakes for 
three years since 2013. In the press release of 
the first semester of 2015 financial statements, 
it was announced that the company’s 
performance was positive, but in reality the 
company’s operating profit suffered a loss 
of IDR 59 billion (economy.okezone.com). 
This case shows the importance of disclosing 
information to stakeholders because the 
success and failure of a company can be seen 
through the financial condition of the company 
that is adequately informed in the company’s 
annual report.
According to Gunawan (2016), the 
information disclosures made by companies 
in annual reports can be classified into two 
types: mandatory disclosure and voluntary 
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is the 
minimum disclosure required by the Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM) 
based on applicable accounting standards. 
Voluntary disclosure is the disclosure of 
information that is not required by the 
government, so companies have the freedom 
to make disclosures (Damayanti and Priyadi, 
2016).
Many studies have been conducted on 
voluntary disclosure. The results of research 
by Ebrahimabadi and Asadi (2016) in Iran 
related to the relationship between corporate 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure in 
various industries show that firm size, debt 
ratio, and profitability ratio have an effect on 
voluntary disclosure quality. Whereas firm 
age, board of directors’ combination, audit 
firm size and free cash flow have no effect on 
voluntary disclosure quality.
The results of research by Gunawan 
(2016) concerning the effect of corporate 
characteristics on the voluntary disclosure of 
annual reports show that institutional share 
ownership, leverage, profitability, and liquidity 
have an influence on the extent of disclosure of 
annual reports. The number of research sample 
used was 104 manufacturing companies period 
2012-2013.
Therefore, it is necessary to conduct this 
research because there are still research gaps in 
the results of previous studies due to differences 
in the characteristics of the independent 
variables, the research objects, the observation 
period, and the disclosure items. The case of 
PT. Timah Tbk during the period of 2012 - 2015 
encouraged the researchers to make mining 
sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) as a research subject with the 
research period 2012-2016. With more up-to-
date data, it is expected to present the latest 
conditions of information disclosure. Based 
on the background mentioned above, this 
research is entitled “The Effect of Financial 
Performance, Board of Commissioners, 
Blockholder Ownership, Auditor Type, and 
Firm Age on Voluntary Disclosure”.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS
Agency Theory
Agency theory explains the relationship 
between shareholders (principal) and 
company executives (agents). Agency theory 
was first proposed by Michael C. Jensen 
and Willian H. Meckling in 1967 stating 
that agency relationships arise when one or 
more individuals (principal) employ other 
individuals (agents) to provide a service and 
then delegate power to the agent to make a 
decision on behalf of the principal.
Wardani (2012) states that the information 
published by companies can cause information 
asymmetry. According to Anshori and Priyadi 
(2014), to oversee and prevent the opportunistic 
behavior of company managers (agents), the 
shareholders (principals) must be willing to 
pay supervision costs, or commonly referred 
to as agency costs. To reduce agency costs that 
arise due to the relationship between managers 
(agents) and shareholders (principal), 
companies will disclose more information 
voluntarily or make wider disclosures to 
stakeholders.
Signaling Theory
Signaling theory was first proposed by 
Michael Spence in 1973 in his research “Job 
Market Signaling Model.” It was stated that in 
the job market, employers are usually willing 
to pay higher cost to hire better workers. 
Individual knows the level of his or her own 
ability, while the recruitment company is 
unable to observe such a thing, resulting in 
information asymmetry between the two 
parties. Educational feasibility can be used as a 
signal for companies to show a certain level of 
ability that is owned by individuals.
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Signaling theory is one of the theories 
underlying the problem of information 
asymmetry. Signaling is used by companies to 
provide positive or negative signals to reduce 
information asymmetry (Sulistyaningsih and 
Gunawan, 2016). According to Chasana and 
Santoso (2017), signaling theory is a theory 
that explains why companies are motivated 
to provide financial information to external 
parties. Voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
is one effort to overcome agency problems and 
minimize information asymmetry between 
agents as management and principals as 
shareholders (Wiguna, 2013)
The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure in the 
Annual Report
Conceptually, disclosure is an integral 
part of financial reporting, while technically, 
disclosure is the final step in the accounting 
process, that is, the presentation of information 
in the form of a full set of corporate financial 
statements. Suwardjono (2010: 578) concludes 
that information disclosure is the provision of 
information in financial statements, notes for 
financial statements, and additional disclosures 
related to financial statements. This does not 
include public or private reports made by 
management or information provided outside 
of financial statements.
According to Gunawan (2016), the exact 
extent of disclosure must be determined in 
accordance with the interests of the company, 
because too much or too little information 
disclosed is not profitable for the company. 
According to Ghozali and Chariri (2007: 378), 
there are three disclosure concepts that are 
commonly used:
1. Adequate disclosure is a minimum 
disclosure that must be done so that the 
financial statements presented do not 
mislead the users of the financial statements
2. Fair disclosure is the disclosure that 
emphasizes more on ethical factors by 
providing fair and feasible information 
and treatment to the users of the financial 
statements
3. Full disclosure is the presentation of 
excessive company information, giving rise 
to the possibility of obscuring significant 
information so that some parties consider 
it not good.
Scott (2009: 16-17) in his book “Financial 
Accounting Theory” suggests that companies 
do full disclosure. Full disclosure can be 
interpreted that in addition to carrying 
out mandatory disclosures that have been 
regulated by regulatory bodies, the companies 
are also recommended to publish additional 
disclosures beyond these mandatory 
disclosures, or commonly referred to as 
voluntary disclosures.
Financial Performance
Financial performance is a description 
of corporate success and financial condition 
in a certain period. Financial performance 
shows the company’s ability to manage and 
control its resources (Kurniawati and Yaya, 
2017). Measurement of corporate financial 
performance is an indicator that investors use to 
assess financial conditions and operating results 
of the company. Also, financial performance 
is one of the factors used by companies to 
determine whether the company’s goals 
have been achieved effectively and efficiently 
(Affandi and Diana, 2017). 
It can be said effective when the tools 
used by the company to achieve the objectives 
have been properly used. Further, it can be 
said efficient when the certain inputs used can 
obtain optimal output. This study uses ratios 
as a measurement of the company’s financial 
performance, such as profitability ratio, 
leverage ratio, and liquidity ratio.
Board of Commissioners
According to Kurniawati and Yaya 
(2017), the board of commissioners is an 
important element in the corporate governance 
mechanism, because the existence of the 
board of commissioners in a company is able 
to encourage the creation of a control system 
and guarantee transparency carried out by 
management. The regulation of Financial 
Services Authority of Indonesia (POJK) 
number 33/ POJK.04/ 2014 concerning the 
board of commissioners article 18 states that 
companies must have at least 2 (two) members 
of the board of commissioners, and article 
20 states that the number of independent 
commissioners must be at least 30% (thirty 
percent) of the total number of members of 
the board of commissioners. Measurement of 
the company’s board of commissioners can 
use attributes, such as board size and board 
independence.
Blockholder Ownership
According to Elfeky (2017), blockholder 
ownership is a large shareholding owned by 
employees, directors, or companies whose 
shareholdings are at least 5% of the company’s 
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total shares outstanding. According to Edmans 
(2014), managers have inadequate shares in the 
company so that the blockholder ownership 
plays an important role in corporate governance 
because the blockholder can intervene in the 
company with the votes they have to maximize 
the value of the company.
Auditor Type
According to Damayanti and Priyadi 
(2016), based on the business scope, there 
are two types of auditors: public accounting 
firms with global/ international scope (The 
Big Four) and public accounting firm with 
domestic/ local scope (Non-The Big Four). 
Public Accounting Firm is a business entity 
that provides professional services in public 
accounting practices (Hidayat, 2017). The big 
four public accounting firms have been known 
by wider community to have a good reputation, 
better quality resources and more experts in 
identifying accounting errors that occur so 
that the audits are conducted more carefully 
and the information is disclosed transparently 
(Fitriana and Prastiwi, 2014)
Firm Age
According to Wardani (2012), firm age is 
an indicator of companies that have experience 
in publishing financial reports and the needs 
of their constituents related to information 
about the company. The increasingly tight 
competition and corporate growth influence 
company management decisions in controlling 
the development of the business world.
The Effect of Financial Performance on 
Voluntary Disclosure
Companies that have high return, 
profit, and/ or leverage as well as those with 
financially strong tend to provide detailed 
information about their condition or financial 
disclosure. For example, according to Wany 
(2015), companies that have good financial 
performance and are able to provide high 
returns will tend to signal (good news) through 
more detailed financial disclosures about the 
condition of the company to the users of the 
financial statements (investors and creditors). 
Every company has obligation to improve its 
financial performance so that the company’s 
shares are still considered attractive to 
investors.
Another fact is as proposed by Malone 
et al, (1993). Based on signaling theory, 
disclosure is used by managers of companies 
that have high profit to signal the company’s 
profitability to investors. To attract investors, 
companies with high profitability will provide 
signals through more detailed disclosure of 
financial statements regarding the condition of 
the companies (Wany, 2015).
Besides high profit, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) also argue that companies with high 
leverage ratio will bear high monitoring 
costs. To reduce agency costs (monitoring 
costs), managers will provide more detailed 
disclosures in annual reports to satisfy 
the needs of creditors for information and 
convince creditors that the debtor will fulfill its 
obligations at maturity date (Wany, 2015).
Last but not least, Wallace et al. (1994), 
also stated that financially-strong companies 
will disclose their financial statements more 
broadly than financially-weak companies. The 
high level of liquidity in a company reflects 
the company’s ability to fulfill its short-term 
obligations (Pratiwi, 2015).
Therefore, there is a relationship between 
the company that is financial strong, high 
profit, or leverage and the detailed disclosure 
in annual report.
H1: Financial performance has an effect on voluntary 
disclosure.
The Effect of Board of Commissioners on 
Voluntary Disclosure
Agency theory explains that the position 
of the board of commissioners is an important 
internal mechanism in supervising the 
company management as an agent because of 
the existence of opportunistic behavior. The 
higher the supervision carried out by the board 
of commissioners, the broader the voluntary 
disclosure of information carried out by 
management.
According to Sulistyaningsih and 
Gunawan (2016), the greater the proportion 
of the board size of the company, the higher 
the monitoring capacity so that the company 
will not be dominated by management. The 
large-sized board of commissioners, from the 
perspective of agency theory, will increase 
supervision so that they will need and decide to 
ask management to make broader disclosures.
According to the agency theory perspective, 
the quality of the board of commissioners as 
a supervisor has an independent function on 
management and the competence of board 
members. According to Fitriana and Prastiwi 
(2014), the greater the proportion of board 
independence, the more effective the level of 
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managerial supervision so that companies can 
increase voluntary disclosure and reduce the 
agency conflict.
H2: The board of commissioners has an effect on 
voluntary disclosure.
The Effect Blockholder Ownership on 
Voluntary Disclosure
The impact of share ownership by 
blockholder ownership on voluntary disclosure 
and transparency can be seen from a positive 
and negative perspective. According to 
Puspitaningrum and Atmini (2012), a positive 
perspective on high blockholder ownership 
by some shareholders can be considered as 
supervision so that it can limit the occurrence 
of agency problems. This type of monitoring by 
shareholders is believed to be able to encourage 
managers to improve performance and run the 
company more transparently, so as to limit the 
occurrence of agency problems.
According to Soliman et al (2016), in line 
with agency theory, the conflict of interest 
that occurs between the majority shareholders 
(blockholders ownership) and minority 
shareholders causes agency costs to be higher. 
According to Juhmani (2013), in a negative 
perspective, very high share ownership can 
prevent management from making extensive 
information disclosures or manipulating 
disclosures at the expense of minority 
shareholders or stakeholders’ interests so as to 
increase agency problem.
H3: Blockholder ownership has an effect on 
voluntary disclosure.
The Effect of Auditor Type on Voluntary 
Disclosure
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
auditing is a form of monitoring which is 
used to reduce company agency costs with 
debt holders and shareholders. Auditing is 
carried out by an audit firm by requesting 
adequate disclosure to management to reduce 
information asymmetry and increase the 
credibility of voluntary disclosure. The auditing 
process is a means for parties interested in the 
company or stakeholders to verify the validity 
of financial statements that have been made by 
the company’s management (Krishna, 2013).
According to Hidayat (2017), the annual 
financial statements issued by companies that 
use public accounting firm affiliated with the 
big four will have a higher level of trust. With 
the existence of good reputation and audit 
performance provided by the public accounting 
firm (The Big Four), the management is 
motivated to conduct voluntary disclosure 
more broadly.
H4: Auditor type has an effect on voluntary 
disclosure
Figure 1
Framework
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The Effect of Firm Age on Voluntary 
Disclosure
Firm age is an indicator of companies that 
have experience in publishing financial reports 
and their constituent needs for information 
about the companies (Wardani, 2012). 
Companies that have long listed as public 
companies provide more information publicity 
than companies that have just listed as public 
companies, as part of corporate accountability 
practices (Hidayat, 2017).
According to Wardani (2012) the 
relationship between the firm age and the size 
of disclosure can be assumed that the longer 
the company becomes a public company, the 
higher the ability of the company to understand 
the information needed by interested parties. 
According to Abeywardana (2016), a long-
standing public company believes that 
disclosing information will not have an impact 
on losing the company’s competitive position. 
The existence of high costs for information 
disclosure and the absence of competitive 
advantages cause new public companies to be 
reluctant to disclose more information.
H5: Firm age has an effect on voluntary disclosure
3. RESEARCH METHOD
Research Design
This research is included in verification research 
which is conducted to ensure the correctness of 
the results of previous studies. This research 
is a quantitative research with secondary data 
sourced from the annual reports of companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). 
The analysis technique used is PLS (Partial 
Least Square)
Research Limitation
The limitations of this study are:
1. Annual reports of mining sector companies 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) for the period 2012-2016
2. Companies that disclosed complete infor-
mation consisting of financial performance, 
board of commissioners, blockholder ow-
nership, auditor type, and company age.
Variable Identification
The variables used in this study are:
1. Endogenous variable (voluntary disclosu-
re)
2. Exogenous variables (financial performan-
ce, board of commissioners, blockholder 
ownership, auditor type, and company 
age)
Operational Definition and Variable 
Measurement
Voluntary Disclosure
Voluntary disclosure is information 
disclosure that is not required by the 
government, so companies have the freedom 
to make disclosures (Damayanti and Priyadi, 
2016). Voluntary disclosure is measured using 
corporate voluntary disclosure index (VDI) 
with 33 items. This study refers to the studies 
conducted by Wulandari and Laksito (2015), 
Gunawan (2016), and Damayantidan Priyadi 
(2016) derived from the research conducted by 
Suripto and Bambang (1999).
 Company Disclosure Item
VDI= 
 Expected Disclosure Item
Financial Performance
a) Profitability (Return on Assets)
According to Harahap (2015: 305), return 
on assets (ROA) describes asset turnover 
measured by total sales, so that the greater 
the ratio, the better the asset to turn over and 
finally gain profit.
   Earning After Tax
Return on total asset= 
     Total Assets
 Share Ownership>50%
BO=     x100%
      Total of Shares
b) Leverage (Debt to Equity Ratio)
Debt to equity ratio (DER) reflects the 
company’s ability to fulfill all its obligations 
using its own capital which is used to pay the 
company’s total debt (Susilowati, 2011).
Debt to Equity Ratio = Total Liabity
           Total Equity
c) Liquidity (Current Ratio)
According to Kasmir (2008: 134-135), 
current ratio is a ratio to measure the company’s 
ability to pay its short-term liabilities that are 
immediately due when billed as a whole.
Current Ratio= Current Asset
  Current Debt
Board of Commissioners
a) Board Size
Board Size is an important factor that 
influences the effectiveness of the board with 
the overall size of the board of commissioners 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013).
Board Size= ∑ board members
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b) Board Independence
Board Independence (BI) is a board of 
commissioners from outside the company 
that help control and limit the opportunistic 
behavior of managers. Their competencies, 
independence and objectivity are needed as 
control functions (Jouirou and Chenguel, 2014).
        ∑ Board Independence Members
BI=         x 100%
 ∑ Board Members
Blockholder Ownership
Blockholder ownership is a large share 
ownership by employees, directors, or 
companies whose ownership at least 5% of 
the total shares outstanding is owned by the 
company (Elfeky, 2017).
Auditor Type
According to Damayanti and Priyadi 
(2016), auditor type is generally divided into 
two categories: global / international Public 
Accounting Firm (The Big 4) and domestic / 
local Public Accounting Firm (Non-The Big 4).
Firm Age
According to Hidayat (2017) the age of 
public company is how long a company is 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
as a public company.
Firm Age = Year of Study – Year of Listing
Population, Sample, and Sampling Technique
The population used in this study is all 
mining sector companies listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) in the period 2012-2016. 
The sampling technique used in this study 
is purposive sampling method, a sampling 
technique that uses certain considerations or 
criteria. The study samples are selected from 
the population based on the criteria as follows:
1. The companies published annual reports 
that expired on 31 December 2012 to 31 
December 2016.
2. The annual reports contained complete 
data according to the needs of each variable 
in the study.
Data Analysis Technique
The data were analyzed using a 
descriptive statistical analysis with SPSS 24.0 
and the SEM-PLS analysis method consisting 
of the outer model (testing construct validity 
Affiliation with The Big Four = ”1”
No Affiliation with The Big Four = ”0”
and reliability) and inner model (R-Square test, 
statistical test) with SmartPLS 3.0.
Descriptive Statistics Analysis
Descriptive statistics illustrate or describe 
data into clearer and more understandable 
information. According to Ghozali (2016: 19), 
descriptive analysis gives a description of 
data that can be seen from the mean, variance, 
maximum, minimum, sum, range, and kurtosis 
and skewness values.
SEM-PLS
According to Latan and Ghozali (2012: 
3), Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is a 
combined data analysis technique from two 
methodology disciplines: 1) econometric 
perspective which focuses on predictions; and 
2) psychometric perspective which is able to 
describe the concept of models using latent 
variables (variables that cannot be measured 
directly, but through manifest variables). 
Partial Least Square (PLS) is a data analysis 
method that is powerful and often referred 
to as soft modeling, a method of eliminating 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
assumptions.
1. Measurement Model (Outer Model)
Evaluation of the measurement model 
(outer model) is used to assess the validity and 
reliability of the model. The outer model shows 
how each indicator block corresponds to its 
latent variable.
Discriminant validity shows that the 
measurement of different constructs is not 
highly correlated. Convergent validity test can 
be done in two ways:
1. The value of loading factors for 
confirmatory study must be more than 
0.70.
2. The value of AVE must be greater than 0.5, 
the square root of the AVE per construct 
is compared with the correlation value 
between constructs in the model
Reliability test is used to prove the level 
of accuracy and consistency of instruments 
in measuring constructs. Reliability test can 
be done in two ways: Cronbach’s alpha and 
composite reliability.
1. The value of Cronbach’s alpha must be 
greater than 0.70.
2. The value of composite reliability must be 
greater than 0.70.
2. Structural Model (Inner Model)
Structural model (inner model) shows the 
relationship or strength of estimation between 
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latent variables or constructs. Evaluation of 
structural models with PLS begins by looking 
at the percentage of variance.
a) R-Square
Changes in the R-Square value can be 
used to explain the effect of independent 
latent variables on dependent latent variables, 
whether having substantive influence or not. 
The R-Square values of 0.75, 0.50, 0.25 explain 
that the model is strong, moderate, weak.
b) T statistic Test
This method uses significance value 
(two-tailed) t-value 1.65 (significance level = 
10%), 1.96 (significance level = 5%), and 2.58 
(significance level = 1%). This approach is used 
to present nonparametric for the precision of 
PLS estimates.
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 shows the number of measurements 
(N), minimum values, maximum values, 
mean values , and standard deviations for 
each endogenous and exogenous variable. The 
total data used in this study are 196 mining 
company data. The following is the discussion 
of descriptive analysis of each variable in the 
study:
Voluntary Disclosure
The voluntary disclosure items most often 
disclosed by mining companies are item 1 and 
item 19 which explain the company’s vision 
and mission and the profile of the company’s 
board of commissioners each period. Voluntary 
disclosure item that is not disclosed by mining 
companies is found in item 23 which explains 
costs separated in fixed component and 
variable.
Voluntary disclosure index describes the 
level of disclosure of company information in 
annual reports. The mean value of voluntary 
disclosure index of 0.5211 indicates that the 
average level of voluntary disclosure of mining 
companies reaches 52.11%, disclosing 17 to 
18 items of 33 items of voluntary disclosure 
expected.
The minimum value of voluntary 
disclosure index of 0.27 was owned by PT. 
Cakra Mineral Investindo in 2012, PT. Cita 
Mineral Investindo in 2012 and 2014, and PT. 
Ratu Prabu Energi in 2015. This means that 
the companies had the lowest information 
disclosure rate in their annual reports during 
the study period, with 9 items of 33 items of 
voluntary disclosure expected.
The maximum value of voluntary 
disclosure index of 0.79 was owned by PT. 
Elnusa and PT. Indo Tambangraya Megah in 
2016. This means that the companies had the 
highest information disclosure rate in their 
annual reports during the study period, with 
26 items of 33 items of voluntary disclosure 
expected. The mean value of 0.5211 which is 
greater than the standard deviation value of 
0.12709 indicates that the level of variation 
in data (data distribution) is relatively small 
(good) or homogeneous.
Financial Performance
Profitability (return on assets)
The mean value of ROA of mining 
companies is 0.01463, explaining that each 
asset managed by the companies is only able 
to generate profits of 1.463% of the total assets 
held. The minimum value of ROA of -0.721 
was owned by PT. Surya Esa Perkasa in 2015. 
The negative value of ROA indicates that each 
asset managed by the company is not good, 
Table 1
Results of Descriptive Analysis
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
VD 196 .27 .79 .5211 .12709
ROA 196 -.721 .577 .01463 .131413
DER 196 -24.118 28.187 1.31584 3.964928
CR 196 .063 78.004 2.82971 6.375289
BS 196 2 13 4.42 1.908
BI 196 .25 .75 .4106 .10942
BO 196 .0771 .9700 .678270 .1978712
UMUR 196 0 26 11.06 7.215
Source: Processed data SPSS 24.0
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resulting in losses of 72.1%.
The maximum value of ROA of 0.577 was 
owned by PT. Garda Tujuh Buana in 2012. The 
proportion of profits obtained is more than 
50% of the company’s assets. This means that 
every asset managed by the company is able 
to produce a profit of 57.7%. The mean value 
of 0.01463 which is smaller than the standard 
deviation value of 0.131413 indicates the level 
of variation in ROE data (data distribution) 
is fairly large (not good) or the data is 
heterogeneous.
Leverage (Debt to Equity Ratio / DER)
The mean value of DER is 1.31584, with 
a debt policy number of more than 1 (above 
100%), indicating that the average mining 
company prefers using debt to using its own 
capital to finance the company’s operations. 
Throughout the study period, the minimum 
value of DER of -24.118 was owned by PT. 
Bumi Resources in 2013. The negative value 
of DER was far below zero, indicating that the 
company experienced an equity deficiency. 
This means that corporate debt was greater 
than its own capital so that the company’s 
operations were more funded by debt.
The maximum value of DER of 28.1871 
was owned by PT. Apexindo Pratama Duta 
in 2014. The value of DER was far above 1, 
indicating that the company’s operations were 
funded more using debt than using company 
capital. The mean value of 1.31584 which is 
smaller than the standard deviation value of 
3.964928 indicating that the level of DER data 
variation (data distribution) is fairly large (not 
good) or the data is heterogeneous.
Liquidity (Current Ratio / CR)
The mean value of CR of 2.82971 indicates 
that the average mining company is able to 
repay short-term liabilities with current assets 
owned, that is, the availability of current 
assets of (IDR / $) 2.8 to pay off each (IDR / $) 
current liabilities of the company. Throughout 
the study period, the minimum value of CR 
of 0.063 was owned by PT. Borneo Lumbung 
Energi & Metal in 2015, meaning that the value 
of current assets is smaller than the current 
liabilities. This indicates that the company is 
not liquid so that the current assets available 
cannot fulfill all short-term liabilities.
The maximum value of CR of 78.004 
was owned by PT. Cakra Mineral Investindo 
in 2013. This means that the value of current 
assets is 78 times as much as its short-term 
liabilities, indicating that the company is 
very liquid so that the company can fulfill its 
short-term obligations using its current assets. 
The mean value of 2.82971 which is smaller 
than the standard deviation value of 6.375289 
indicates the level of CR data variation (data 
distribution) is fairly large (not good) or the 
data is heterogeneous.
Board of Commissioners
Board Size (BS)
The mean value of BS of 4.42 indicates 
that the average mining company has 4 to 5 
members of the board of commissioners in 
supervising management performance, so that 
it meets the mandatory requirements of at least 
2 members of the board of commissioners. The 
minimum value of BS of 2 people was owned by 
PT. Ratu Prabu Energi and PT. Cakra Mineral 
Investindo (2012 - 2016), PT. Borneo Lumbung 
Energy & Metal (2014 - 2016), PT. Cita Mineral 
Investindo (2012 and 2013), PT. J Resources 
Asia Pacific (2015 and 2016), PT. Sugih Energy 
in 2012 and PT. Main SMR throughout the 
5 years of research period. This means that 
the small number of members of the board 
of commissioners can lead to less effective 
supervision and less guaranteed transparency 
carried out by company management.
The maximum value of BS of 13 people 
was owned by PT. Bumi Resources in 2012, 
indicating that the increasing number of 
members of the board of commissioners has 
caused companies to be more effective in 
supervising the performance of company 
management because it can create better 
coordination, communication, and more 
practical decision making. The mean value of 
4.42 which is greater than the standard deviation 
value of 1.908 indicates that the level of BS data 
variation (data distribution) is relatively small 
(good) or the data is homogeneous.
Board Independence (BI)
The mean value of BI of 0.4106 indicates 
that the average mining company has an 
independent board of commissioners reaching 
41.06% of the total members of the board of 
commissioners, thus meeting the Regulation 
of Financial Services Authority of Indonesia 
(POJK) mandatory requirements of at least 
30%. The minimum value of BI of 0.25 was 
owned by PT. Baramulti Suksessarana in 2015, 
PT. Darma Henwa and PT. Sugih Energy in 
2013, PT. Surya Esa Perkasa (2012 and 2015 
- 2016) and PT. Petrosea in 2014. This means 
that there is a lack of an independent board of 
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commissioners 25% of the total members of the 
board of commissioners so that the monitoring 
function over management performance is not 
going well.
The maximum value of BI of 0.75 was 
owned by PT. Golden Eagle Energy in 2015. 
This means the number of independent board 
of commissioners is 75% of the total members 
of the board of commissioners so that the 
monitoring function over the management 
performance can be effective and efficient. 
The mean value of 0.4106 which is greater 
than the standard deviation value of 0.10942 
indicates the level of BI data variation (data 
distribution) is fairly small (good) or the data 
is homogeneous.
Blockholder Ownership (BO)
The mean value of BO of 0.67698 indicates 
that the level of monitoring of mining company 
management reaches 67.68%  of shareholders 
(controllers) with share ownership of at least 
5%, while the remaining 32.32% of minority 
shareholders with share ownership less than 
5%. The minimum value of BO of 0.0771 was 
owned by PT. Sigmagold Inti Perkasa in 2012 
and 2013, meaning that blockholder ownership 
is only 7.71% of the company’s total outstanding 
shares while 92.29% was owned by minority 
shareholders with shares ownership of less 
than 5% so that low blockholder ownership 
makes monitoring of company management 
less efficient.
The maximum value of BO of 0.9700 
was owned by PT. Golden Energy Mines 
throughout the research period. This means 
that blockholder ownership is 97% of the 
company’s total outstanding shares while 
the remaining 3% was owned by minority 
shareholders with share ownership of less 
than 5%. So, high blockholder ownership 
shows strict supervision of management 
performance in minimizing opportunistic 
actions of manager in managing the company. 
The mean value of 0.678270 which is greater 
than the standard deviation value of 0.1978712 
indicates that the level of BO data variation 
(data distribution) is relatively small (good) or 
the data is homogeneous.
1. Auditor Type
Table 2 shows that the average mining 
company used Non-The Big Four Public 
Accounting Firm during the study period. In 
order to obtain the fairness of the presentation 
of company financial statements in accordance 
with Financial Accounting Standard (SAK), 
most mining companies choose to use Non-
The Big Four auditors rather than the Big Four 
auditors. 
Table2
Frequency Testing
Category Frequency %
Non-The Big 4 104 53.06
The Big 4 92 46.94
Total Sample 196 100.0
Source: Processed data 
2. Firm Age (AGE)
The minimum value of AGE of 0 was 
owned by PT. Baramulti Suksessarana, PT. 
Surya Esa Perkasa, PT. Toba Bara Sejahtera in 
2012, PT. Mitrabara Adiperdana in 2014, and 
PT. Merdeka Copper Gold in 2015. This means 
that the companies are still listing less than 1 
year on the Indonesia Stock Exchange so that 
the company’s management still does not have 
enough experience in presenting information 
about the company. The maximum AGE value 
of 26 was owned by PT. Vale Indonesia in 2016 
which means that the company has been listing 
for more than 26 years on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange so that the company’s management 
has a lot of experience in presenting information 
according to the needs of its constituents. The 
mean value of 11.06 which is greater than the 
standard deviation value of 7.215 indicates 
that the level of AGE data variation (data 
distribution) is relatively small (good) or the 
data is homogeneous.
SEM-PLS Analysis
There are 2 (two) steps in conducting 
SEM-PLS analysis:
1. Measurement Model (Outer Model)
Evaluation of the reflective construct 
measurement model (outer model) is carried 
out to assess the validity and reliability of the 
model through confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA). Reliability testing is done to prove 
the accuracy and consistency of instruments 
in measuring constructs (Latan and Ghozali, 
2012: 79).
The variables of voluntary disclosure, 
board of commissioners, blockholder owner-
ship, auditor type, and company age are valid 
because they have values greater than 0.5 for 
AVE and greater than 0.7 for loading factor 
(rho_A). The variable of financial performance 
has an average variance extracted (AVE) value of 
0.475 and loading factor (rho_A) value of 0.674, 
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while the variable of board of commissioners 
has a loading factor (rho_A) value of 0.577. So, 
it can be said that the indicators used by the 
latent variables of financial performance and 
board of commissioners are invalid because the 
AVE value is smaller than 0.5 and the loading 
factor (rho_A) value is smaller than 0.7. 
The variables of voluntary disclosure, 
blockholder ownership, auditor type, and firm 
age are reliable because they have a Cronbach’s 
alpha value and the composite reliability value 
greater than 0.7. The variable of financial 
performance has Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.476 and composite reliability value of 0.669. 
The variable of board of commissioners has 
Cronbach’s alpha value of -0.221 and composite 
reliability value of 0.353. So, it can be said that the 
indicators used by latent variables of financial 
performance and board of commissioners are 
not reliable because they have values smaller 
than 0.7. The financial performance and board 
of commissioner indicators that are not valid 
and reliable must be removed from the model.
In Table 4, it can be seen that the board 
independence (BI) outer model indicator value 
is -0.263 and the debt to equity ratio (DER) is 
0.106, which means that the indicator is neither 
valid nor reliable so it must be removed from 
the model.
2. Structural Model (Inner Model)
In Figure 2 shows that the construct values 
for the board of commissioners, blockholder 
ownership, auditor type, and firm age are 0.000 
because the exogenous latent variables are only 
formed by one indicator which means that there 
is no comparison indicator, while financial 
performance is formed by two comparison 
indicators (return on assets and debt to equity 
ratio). After being valid and reliable, the next 
step is to evaluate the structural model (inner 
model).
Evaluating the structural model (inner 
model) is conducted by using PLS by looking 
Table 3
Validity and Reliability of Construct
Cronbach’s Alpha rho_A Composite Reliability (AVE)
Voluntary Disclosure 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Financial Performance 0.476 0.674 0.669 0.475
Board of Commissioners -0.221 0.577 0.353 0.521
Blockholder Ownership 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Auditor Type 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Firm Age 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Source: Processed data SmartPLS 3.0
Table 4
Measurement Model (Outer Model)
A
ud
ito
r T
yp
e
Bl
oc
kh
ol
de
r
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
 B
oa
rd
 o
f 
C
om
m
is
si
o-
 
ne
rs
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
Fi
rm
 A
ge
V
ol
un
ta
ry
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e
BI −0.263
BO 1.000
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Age 1.000
VDI 1.000
Source: Processed data SmartPLS 3.0
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at the R-Square value for each endogenous 
latent variable as the predictive power of 
the structural model. R-Square value is the 
coefficient of determination in endogenous 
construct. The result of the R-square value 
represents the number of variances of the 
constructs explained by the model (Latan and 
Ghozali, 2012: 82).
a) R-square Test
Table 5
R-Square
R-Square Adjusted R-Square 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 0.439 0.424
Source: Processed data SmartPLS 3.0
Table 5 shows that Adjusted R-Square 
value is 0.424. This means that the variables of 
financial performance, board of commissioners, 
blockholder ownership, auditor type, and firm 
age are able to explain voluntary disclosure 
of 42.4 percent. The remaining 57.6 percent 
is explained by other variables outside of 
research. Adjusted R-Square value of 0.424 
indicates that the model is weak because it is 
above 0.25.
b) Hypothesis Test (t statistical test)
Testing this hypothesis is done through 
a bootstrapping procedure. Bootstrapping 
procedure uses all original samples to do 
resampling (Latan and Ghozali, 2012: 84). 
Bootstrapping in this study is carried out 500 
times so that the results obtained are better 
and more stable. The conditions that must 
be fulfilled in hypothesis testing are that 
the t-statistic value must be greater than Zα 
(significance level) 0.5 (5%) = 1.96 so that to 
ensure the presence or absence of the influence 
of exogenous variables on endogenous 
variable.
H1:  Financial performance has an effect on 
voluntary disclosure
The results of the first hypothesis test 
show that t-statistic value is 4.072 greater than 
the Zα value (significance level) 0.5 (5%) = 1.96 
with the original sample value of 0.184 which 
means that there is a positive influence. So it 
can be stated that the variable of financial 
performance has a significant positive effect on 
voluntary disclosure, thus the first hypothesis 
(H1) is accepted.
Source: Processed data SmartPLS 3.0
Figure 2
Framework for Bootstrapping Test
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H2:  The board of commissioners has an effect on 
voluntary disclosure
The results of the second hypothesis test 
show that t-statistic value is 6.205 greater than 
the value of Zα (significance level) 0.5 (5%) 
= 1.96 with the original sample value 0.376 
which means that there is a positive influence. 
So it can be stated that the variable of board 
of commissioners has a significant positive 
effect on voluntary disclosure, thus the second 
hypothesis (H2) is accepted.
H3: Blockholder ownership has an effect on 
voluntary disclosure
The results of the third hypothesis test 
show that t-statistic value is 2.630 greater than 
the value of Zα (significance level) 0.5 (5%) = 
1.96 with the original sample value of -0.160 
which means that there is a negative influence. 
Therefore, it can be stated that the variable 
of blockholder ownership has a significant 
negative effect on voluntary disclosure, thus 
the third hypothesis (H3) is accepted.
H4: Auditor type has an effect on voluntary 
disclosure
The results of the fourth hypothesis test 
show that t-statistic value is 6.105 greater than 
the value of Zα (significance level) 0.5 (5%) = 
1.96 with the original sample value of 0.381, 
which means that there is a positive influence. 
The auditor type variable is a dummy variable 
used to determine opportunities, so there 
is no need to determine the direction of the 
relationship between variables, whether 
positive or negative. So it can be stated that 
the variable of auditor type has a significant 
effect on voluntary disclosure, thus the fourth 
hypothesis (H4) is accepted.
H5: Firm age has an effect on voluntary disclosure
The results of the fifth hypothesis test 
show that t-statistic value is 0.367 smaller than 
the value of Zα (significance level) 0.5 (5%) = 
1.96. So it can be stated that the variable of firm 
age has no effect on voluntary disclosure, thus 
the fifth hypothesis (H5) is rejected.
DISCUSSION
The Effect of Financial Performance on 
Voluntary Disclosure
Theoretically, companies that have good 
financial performance and are able to provide 
high return will tend to signal (good news) 
through more detailed financial disclosures 
about the condition of the company to users of 
financial statements (Wany, 2015). The results 
of research hypothesis testing using SEM-
PLS with SmartPLS 3.0 show that financial 
performance (ROA and CR) has a significant 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure (IPS).
The results show that during the 2012-2016 
study period, the higher the values of ROA 
and CR of mining companies, the higher the 
level of voluntary disclosure, and vice versa. 
This is because the mining company with 
high profitability and liquidity indicates that 
company’s financial performance is in good 
condition (positive signal) so that the company 
conducts voluntary disclosure extensively to 
maintain the company’s business continuity. 
Conversely, company with low profitability 
and liquidity causes management not to convey 
other information because it is considered a 
negative signal so that the company discloses 
information as needed only.
The results of this study are in line with the 
results of the studies conducted by Elfeky (2017), 
Gunawan (2016), Embrahimabadi and Asadi 
(2016), Abeywardana and Pandhitharathna 
(2016), Soliman (2013), Krishna (2013), and 
Wiguna (2012). However, the results of this 
study do not support the results of the research 
conducted by Hieu and Lan (2015), Wany 
(2015), Jouirou and Chenguel (2014), and 
Juhmani (2013) that financial performance has 
no effect on voluntary disclosure.
The Effect of the Board of Commissioners on 
Voluntary Disclosure
Theoretically, companies with a larger 
size of board of commissioners can offer more 
knowledge and expertise, as well as capacity to 
monitor and share workloads with management 
performance (Allegrini and Greco, 2013). 
The results of the research hypothesis testing 
using SEM-PLS with SmartPLS 3.0 show that 
board size has a significant positive effect on 
voluntary disclosure. However, the results of 
the hypothesis testing show that even a small 
board size has a positive effect on voluntary 
disclosure. This is because the average number 
of board members in mining companies during 
the study period was 4.44 or far higher than 
the requirement set by the Financial Service 
Authority (OJK) which requires a minimum 
of 2 members of the board of commissioners. 
This indicates that the size of board of 
commissioners in mining companies is the 
measure of the effectiveness of supervision, 
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because the large number of board members 
allows the company not to be dominated by 
management in carrying out its role more 
effectively so that companies tend to disclose 
more voluntary disclosure.
Descriptive data on board size that is 
homogeneous is also an indicator that the size 
of board of commissioners has a significant 
effect on voluntary disclosure. The results of 
this study are in line with the results of the 
research conducted by Allegrini and Greco 
(2013) that board size has a significant effect 
on voluntary disclosure. However, the results 
of this study do not support the results of the 
study conducted by Elfeky (2017) that board 
size has no effect on voluntary disclosure.
The Effect Blockholder Ownership on 
Voluntary Disclosure
In line with the agency theory, a conflict 
of interest that occurs between the majority 
shareholders (blockholders ownership) and 
minority shareholders causes agency costs to 
be higher (Soliman et al, 2016). The results of 
the research hypothesis test using SEM-PLS 
with SmartPLS 3.0 show that blockholder 
ownership (BO) has a significant negative 
effect on voluntary disclosure.
However, the results show that during 
the 2012-2016 study period, the higher the 
blockholder ownership of mining companies, 
the lower the level of voluntary disclosure, 
and vice versa. This is because companies 
that have high blockholder ownership make 
it easier for majority shareholders to access 
information directly from management. As a 
result, companies tend to disclose information 
to the public as needed only.
Descriptive data of blockholder ownership 
that is homogeneous is also an indicator that 
blockholder ownership has a significant effect 
on voluntary disclosure. The results of this 
study are in line with the results of the research 
conducted by Elfeky (2017) and Juhmani (2013) 
that blockholder ownership has a significant 
negative effect on voluntary disclosure.
The Effect of Auditor Type on Voluntary 
Disclosure
According to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), agency theory suggests that companies 
carry out auditor choice as a mechanism to 
reduce conflicts of interest that occur between 
shareholders (principals) and company 
managers (agents), because audits facilitate 
shareholders in the process of monitoring 
management performance. The results of 
the hypothesis testing using SEM-PLS with 
SmartPLS 3.0 show that auditor type (AT) has 
a significant effect on voluntary disclosure.
The number of mining companies that 
use the Big Four Public Accounting Firm is 
smaller than those that use Non-Big Four 
Public Accounting Firm, but the level of 
voluntary disclosure of mining companies 
tends to increase during the study period. The 
reason is that, on the one hand, large Public 
Accounting Firms have greater incentives to 
demand disclosures that could harm clients 
(Malone et al, 1993), so that fewer mining 
companies use Public Accounting Firm (Big 
Four) to audit their financial statements. On 
the other hand, small Public Accounting Firm 
that is not reputable is very sensitive and 
responsive to client requests. This results in 
management being motivated to disclose more 
additional information voluntarily in annual 
reports as expected in order to maintain the 
company’s credibility in the eyes of investors 
and shareholders.
The results of this study are in line with 
the results of the research conducted by Elfeky 
(2017), Wany (2015), Jouirou and Chenguel 
(2014), and Krishna (2013) that auditor type 
has a significant effect on voluntary disclosure. 
But the results of this study do not support 
the results of the research conducted by 
Damayantidan Priyadi (2016), Embrahimadi 
and Asadi (2016), Hieu and Lan (2015), and 
Soliman (2013) that auditor type has no effect 
on voluntary disclosure.
The Effect of Firm Age on Voluntary 
Disclosure
Theoretically, the companies that have 
longer time listing provide more information 
publicity than the new ones, as part of corporate 
accountability practices (Hidayat, 2017). The 
results of research hypothesis testing using 
SEM-PLS with SmartPLS 3.0 show that firm 
age has no effect on voluntary disclosure.
Most mining companies are companies 
that have just been listed on the IDX, while 
on the other hand voluntary disclosure has 
actually increased during the study period. This 
indicates that the age of mining companies has 
no effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
The firm age cannot be a benchmark for the 
level of voluntary disclosure as described by 
the company’s annual report, because the 
company only wants to disclose information 
that is considered important and can have an 
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influence on the company’s business continuity 
in the future.
The results of this study are in line with 
the results of the research conducted by 
Embrahimadi and Asadi (2016) and Soliman 
(2013) that firm age has no effect on voluntary 
disclosure. But the results of this study 
do not support the research conducted by 
Abeywardana and Panditharathna (2016) and 
Damayantidan Priyadi (2016) that firm age has 
a significant effect on voluntary disclosure. 
The results of research conducted by Jouirou 
and Chenguel (2014) and Wardani (2012) show 
that firm age has a negative effect on voluntary 
disclosure.
5. CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND 
SUGGESTION
Conclusion
Based on the analysis conducted on mining 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange 
during the period 2012-2016, 196 companies 
were selected as the sample, accompanied by 
explanations and discussion of the results of 
the analysis tests which can be concluded as 
follows:
1. Financial performance has a significant 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure.
Companies that have high profitability and 
liquidity reflect that their financial performance 
is in good condition (positive signal) so that 
the companies conduct voluntary disclosure 
widely to maintain the company’s business 
continuity, and vice versa. Companies with low 
profitability and liquidity cause management 
not to convey other information because it is 
considered a negative signal so the company 
discloses information as needed only.
2. The board of commissioners has a 
significant positive effect on voluntary 
disclosure.
Companies with a large board of 
commissioners are likely to voluntarily disclose 
more information in annual reports, and vice 
versa. The size of the board of commissioners 
in a company is a matter of supervision, 
because with a large proportion of board of 
commissioners the company is not dominated 
by management in carrying out its role more 
effectively.
3. Blockholder ownership has a significant 
negative effect on voluntary disclosure
Companies that have high blockholder 
ownership reflect the limitations of company 
information by management so that the 
companies tend to disclose information to the 
public as needed only, and vice versa. This 
condition is worse when the blockholders 
exceed the level of ownership which only 
benefits themselves at the expense of minority 
shareholders.
4. Auditor type has a significant effect on 
voluntary disclosure
Most mining companies use the reputation 
and performance of Non-Big Four Public 
Accounting Firms. Small Public Accounting 
Firms that are not reputable are very sensitive 
and responsive to client requests causing 
small Public Accounting Firms to be very 
easy to meet client requests. This results in 
management being motivated to disclose more 
additional information voluntarily in annual 
reports as expected in order to maintain the 
company’s credibility in the eyes of investors 
and shareholders.
5. Firm age has no effect on voluntary 
disclosure
The results of this study prove that 
the age of firm listing cannot be used as a 
benchmark for companies in making extensive 
information disclosures. This means that the 
company only wants to disclose information 
that is considered important and relevant in its 
annual report to give a better influence on the 
company’s business continuity in the future.
Limitation
1. Some items of voluntary disclosure items 
are included in the mandatory disclosure 
items
2. There is subjectivity in analyzing each item 
of voluntary disclosure
3. The SEM-PLS test used in this study ignores 
several (non-parametric) assumptions
Suggestion
1. It is recommended that the next researchers 
develop and update the list of voluntary 
disclosure items that are free from 
mandatory disclosure items
2. It is recommended that the next researchers 
analyze voluntary disclosure items based 
on company provisions that have been 
adjusted to the regulation of the Financial 
Service Authority of Indonesia (OJK)
3. It is recommended that the next researchers 
use other test tools such as multiple linear 
regression and Ordinary Least Square 
regression so that testing is carried out 
with several (non-parametric) assumptions
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